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THE MIRAGE OF GLOBAL JUSTICE*
By Chandran Kukathas
I. Introduction
Theories of global justice address two main issues. First, what would a
just distribution of benefits and burdens across the world look like? Sec-
ond, what sorts of institutions would be required to secure such a just
distribution? Many other related questions inevitably arise when these
problems are addressed. Perhaps the most notable is how to establish
such institutions given the diversity of sovereign nations and the fact of
global inequalities of wealth and power. For many, these questions are
urgent because we live in a world in which millions live in desperate
poverty. They are salient not only because many people enjoy great wealth
but also because the disparity in riches may itself be the product of unjust
global institutions. On this view, it might be said, justice is the first virtue
of global institutions. Institutions, no matter how efficient and well-
arranged, must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust.
For some theories, however, the issue of global justice has a wider
scope. The protection of human rights generally, it is argued, is a matter
of justice. Just institutions would ensure not only that the distribution of
benefits and burdens was morally justifiable but also that people were
secure against the predations of despots and warlords. The security of
people’s individual liberties and political rights is also a matter of justice.
To establish global justice requires institutions that secure human rights
broadly understood.
The thesis of this essay is that the political pursuit of global justice is not
a worthy goal, and that our aims in establishing international legal and
political institutions should be more modest. Its primary argument is that
the pursuit of justice in the international order is dangerous to the extent
that it requires the establishment of powerful supranational agencies, or
legitimizes greater and more frequent exercises of political, economic, and
military power by strong states or coalitions. The primary concern in the
establishment and design of all legal and political institutions should be
not to secure justice but to limit power. It is a mistake to think that a
distinction can be drawn between power created to do good and power
* For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay, I would like to thank Jerry Gaus,
David Miller, Dan Greenwood, Peggy Battin, Leslie Francis, Erika George, Cindy Stark, and
Deen Chatterjee, as well as my fellow contributors to this volume. For especially detailed
and helpful editorial comments and advice, I would like to thank Ellen Paul.
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created to do evil, or that we are capable of devising institutions that can
honor the distinction.
The essay is organized in the following way. In Section II, I articulate a
conception of global order in which justice has a limited part. In Sec-
tion III, I advance the main reasons why our concern for justice should be
limited. In Section IV, I consider some important objections to this view-
point, particularly those advanced by such contemporary political phi-
losophers asAllen Buchanan and Thomas Pogge, who contend that justice
should be a central concern of global economic and legal institutions. In
Section V, I offer replies to these criticisms, and in Section VI, I offer some
general conclusions.
II. Justice and Global Order
There are two primary positions taken in contemporary political theory
on global justice. The first asserts that justice, and in particular, social
justice, is something that cannot be attained globally but can be pursued
successfully only by the nation-state. The most influential statement of
this view is offered by John Rawls in The Law of Peoples,1 though there
have been other notable defenders of this position who have presented
independent or complementary reasons for it. David Miller, for example,
has presented a case for limiting the scope of distributive justice; and
Michael Walzer has argued that justice cannot be a global ideal but only
a local one, tied as it must be to local understandings.2 The second posi-
tion on global justice repudiates the first, insisting that there are standards
of justice that should properly be regarded as globally significant. Prin-
ciples of justice that hold within the nation-state should also hold, mutatis
mutandis, across or among states. To put the matter in another way, if
individuals have basic rights in virtue of their humanity, then these are
rights they hold as against the whole world; and responsibility for uphold-
ing them falls upon the world as a whole rather than upon the nations in
which they happen to reside. Such views have been defendedmost recently
by philosophers such as Allen Buchanan and Thomas Pogge, though
others, such as Henry Shue and Peter Singer, have been arguing for some
time that considerations of justice should inform the foreign policies of
wealthy nations to a much greater degree than such considerations do at
present.3
1 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
2 See David Miller, “Justice and Global Inequality,” in A. Hurrell and N. Woods, eds.,
Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 187–210;
David Miller, “National Self-Determination and Global Justice,” in Miller, Citizenship and
National Identity (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2000); and Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).
3 See Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and
Human Rights (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2002); Henry Shue, Basic Rights (Princeton, NJ:
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Aparticularly sharp statement of this second position is put forward by
Darrel Moellendorf in criticism of Rawls, and in defense of cosmopolitan
justice. Rawls, he observes, conceives of the international order as one in
which toleration is extended even to regimes that are “unreasonable,
intolerant, [and] oppressive” by the standards of Rawls’s own doctrine as
developed in his Political Liberalism.4 But to be tolerant of such regimes,
Moellendorf suggests, is to be tolerant of unjust actions or oppressive
cultural practices when there are no good reasons for being so. “In fact,
just as institutionalizing an arrangement that permitted individuals to be
unjust could be seen as being complicit in the injustice, so institutional-
izing principles of international conduct that licensed oppression could
be seen as being complicit in the oppression.” 5 On this view, if there are
good reasons to pursue or uphold justice within the nation-state, those
reasons also support upholding justice across the globe.
My thesis in this essay is that justice should not be pursued globally.
The position defended here differs from those of Rawls, Walzer, and
Miller, however, because it also rejects the idea that justice is something
that should be pursued within the nation-state. It acknowledges that the
advocates of global or cosmopolitan justice have a point in demanding
consistency from those who argue for justice at home but are prepared to
tolerate injustice abroad. But it also acknowledges the force of the argu-
ments of those who are skeptical about global justice, and who consider
the pursuit of justice on that scale implausible.
Justice, it should be noted, may be understood in many different ways.
At its broadest, justice could be said to be the subject of any general
account of how people should live. On this view, Plato’s Republic gives us
an account of justice no less than does Marx’s theory of communism—
even if Marx regards “justice” as a bourgeois virtue that has no place in
post-capitalist society. A narrower view of justice sees it as concerning the
proper distribution of benefits and burdens in society. Justice is a char-
acteristic of the rules or the institutions that determine the entitlements
people have, individually or as groups, to parts of the material world, and
to the services of others. A theory of justice would offer an account of
what people are entitled to under the rules of justice, and also what
measures may be taken by an appropriately constituted authority to ensure
that justice is upheld. A narrower view still regards justice as a matter of
the application of rules rather than a matter of the rightness or “fairness”
of the rules. Justice, in this sense, may be served if the law is consistently
applied, even if the law is systematically unfair.
Princeton University Press, 1980); Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philoso-
phy and Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (1972): 229–43; and Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of
Globalization (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002).
4 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, paperback edition (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1996).
5 Darrel Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 28.
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My concern in this essay is with justice in the second of these three
senses. That is to say, my concern is with social or distributive justice.
Theories of distributive justice are numerous, ranging from the Nozickian
view that a just distribution is any distribution that is the outcome of just
acquisition and just transfer of resources,6 to socialist views that regard all
resources as collectively owned and properly allocated according to need,
to views associated with particular religious or cultural traditions. Islamic
conceptions of distributive justice, for example, allow for private prop-
erty, but impose particular constraints on its use. Different views of dis-
tributive justice may also be shaped by particular views about the status
of persons, what constitutes a violation of persons or their property, and
what forms of punishment are justified. Ideas about what justice requires
are at least as numerous as the different communities that are to be found
in a diverse society (such as the United States), though the differences
among some of them are more trivial than the differences among others.
Christians have much in common in their thinking about justice; yet
while some think that distributive justice requires ensuring that all women
have access to medical services to terminate unwanted pregnancies, oth-
ers think that justice can require no such thing, since abortion is morally
wrong.
On this understanding of justice, it is something that would be difficult
to pursue in a society marked by a diversity of opinions and a variety of
communities, since there would be many views about what justice
demands. Any commitment to accommodating a diversity of ways of life
would make it difficult to advocate a single standard of social or distrib-
utive justice. I suggest that it is neither possible nor desirable to pursue
justice in this sense within a single nation-state. Consequently, we should
not pursue social or distributive justice at the global level.
To put the issue schematically, there are four possible positions available
on the question of whether justice (or social justice) should be pursued at
home and abroad. (See Figure 1.) Position A suggests that social justice
should be pursued at home and abroad; B that it should be pursued at home
but not abroad; C that it should be pursued abroad but not at home; and
D that it should be pursued neither at home nor abroad. Position C is per-
haps the view least likely to find a representative, though it is not unusual
for some political leaders to argue for global (re)distributive justice, while
insisting on the importance of national sovereignty, and their own immu-
nity from international criticism. This position has been expressed in a num-
ber of international declarations, such as the 1993 Bangkok Declaration.7
6 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), chap. 7.
7 See the Bangkok Declaration of the ministers and representatives of Asian states, meet-
ing at Bangkok from March 29 to April 2, 1993, pursuant to General Assembly resolution
46/116 of December 17, 1991, in preparation for the World Conference on Human Rights.
While “welcoming” the attention paid to human rights in the international community, the
declaration’s evident concern was to downplay the relevance of human rights by asserting—
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In this essay, I defend position D against A, B, and C. (F. A. Hayek has also
defended positionD, insisting that social justice cannot be pursued at home
or abroad since the very idea is incoherent.)8
In my view, then, the international global order should, like domestic
or national societies, properly be conceived as a network of independent
jurisdictions bound not by any shared (or imposed) understanding of
justice but simply by a commitment to mutual toleration. The most impor-
tant imperative in the international order is to avoid war. International
institutions, including international organizations (such as the United
Nations) and international regimes (such as that established by the 1951
Refugee Convention) may be useful if they help to keep the peace, and if
they define mutually acceptable conventions by which problems common
to global society might be peacefully addressed.
This view might appear to be a defense of a Westphalian model of
international order, one that is dominated by sovereign states recognized
as the subjects of international law. The Peace of Westphalia, which in
1648 brought an end to the Eighty Years’ War between Spain and the
Netherlands, and to the German phase of the Thirty Years’ War, greatly
weakened the power of the Holy Roman Empire. It confirmed the 1555
and reasserting—the “principles of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and
non-interference in the internal affairs of States.” This concern is especially apparent in the
declaration’s wish to “discourage any attempt to use human rights as conditionality for
extending development assistance,” to emphasize the importance of “the non-use of human
rights as an instrument of political pressure,” and to reiterate “that all countries . . . have the
right to determine their political systems, control and freely utilize their resources, and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” Human rights, it seems, are
very important—important enough to justify the spending of increasing sums of money to
promote “awareness of human rights,” but not important enough to justify others’ invoking
them to scrutinize or criticize the workings of states. See http://law.hku.hk/lawgovtsociety/
Bangkok%20Declaration.htm (accessed May 2001).
8 F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, vol. 2, The Mirage of Social Justice (London:
Routledge, 1976).
Social justice
abroad
No social justice
abroad
Social justice
at home A: Pogge, Moellendorf B: Rawls, Walzer, Miller
No social justice
at home C: Bangkok Declaration D: Hayek, Kukathas
Figure 1. Four positions on the pursuit of social justice.
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Peace of Augsburg, which had granted Lutherans religious toleration in
the Holy Roman Empire, and it extended toleration to the Calvinists. In
recognizing the territorial sovereignty of member states, it is often asserted,
the Peace of Westphalia also established the principle cuius regio eius
religio: that the religion of the head of state would be the religion of the
people within that domain. This is not quite accurate, since the articles of
peace required states to tolerate religious minorities. The authority of the
Holy Roman Empire was dramatically reduced, however, and the sover-
eign power of some three hundred princes was increased. The modern
world order could be said to operate on the Westphalian model in as
much as it is a world of states, since European colonialism—and, more
particularly, decolonization—brought states into being right across the
globe. By the provisions of the Peace of Westphalia, princes eventually
became absolute sovereigns in their own dominions, immune to the inter-
ventions of the Holy Roman Emperor. In the modern world, indepen-
dence and immunity against foreign intervention are central aspects of
state sovereignty.9
At least to a limited extent, it is the Westphalian model that is com-
mended in this essay. The virtue of the Westphalian ideal is that it divides
power, recognizing as it does the diversity of claims of political authority,
and that it appreciates the importance of avoidingwar. Its weakness is that
it strengthens the hand of the state, allowing it to act with immunitywithin
its borders—evenwhen its behavior is imprudent, unjust, or, at the extreme,
barbaric. But if it is undesirable that there be any authority with power that
can be so abused, it is even less desirable that such power be extended in
scope to covermore andmore domains—to create empires or a world gov-
ernment. Better to have many petty tyrants than a few great ones.
There are, of course, other reasons to be skeptical about theWestphalian
model. In the 350 years and more since the Treaty of Westphalia was
signed, not just Europe but the world has seen countless wars in which
millions have died. Moreover, particularly in the twentieth century, the
numbers killed in war have been dwarfed by the hundreds of millions
killed by their own governments.10 The state is a difficult institution to
defend even with mild enthusiasm. Nonetheless, the Westphalian model
may have something to commend it if only because some of the alterna-
tives being advocated are so unattractive. One alternative is to establish
a more powerful force able to deal with the problem of bad states. A
9 Strictly speaking, the doctrine that states as sovereign powers had the right to rule by
their own structures of authority, without intervention from other states, was not estab-
lished by the Peace of Westphalia but developed later in the legal theory of the Swiss jurist
Emerich Vattel. “Westphalian sovereignty” is a widely used term, but it is probably a
misnomer. See Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1999). It is worth noting, as Krasner emphasizes, that states enjoy sover-
eignty to varying degrees.
10 See Rudolph Rummel, Death by Government: Genocide and Mass Murder in the Twentieth
Century (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994).
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second alternative is to develop international institutions that will autho-
rize systematic intervention in the affairs of bad states by other states
or coalitions of states—so that good states will reform bad ones. The
Westphalian model is preferable to either of these.11 Further decentral-
ization may be preferable to a world of sovereign states; but a world of
independent states is still better than a world of states subordinated to a
greater power—whether the global Leviathan is a single body or an assem-
bly of states.
This view does not assume that states must be regarded as economi-
cally self-sufficient units, or as culturally and politically undifferentiated
entities, capable of relating to one another only as bargainers pursuing
their own advantage. In freer political systems, cities and provinces, as
well as other forms of association, will also be internationally significant
political actors. Agreements will be reached betweenmany different forms
of associations besides states. States themselves may relinquish aspects of
their sovereignty when they sign treaties or enter into conventions that
bind them and limit what they may do even within their own borders.
Signing the Kyoto Agreement on global warming (and then ratifying it)
would limit a state’s freedom to make laws that violated the agreement’s
provisions on acceptable greenhouse gas emissions. Being party to the
1951 convention on the treatment of refugees restricts a state’s ability to
turn people away from its borders if they come seeking asylum, for
signing the agreement meant signing away elements of state sovereignty.
A world of sovereign states need not be a world in which all political
relations exist only between undifferentiated polities unaffected by inter-
national ties or international obligations.12
Despite these ties, however, ours is not a world united by shared moral
convictions or a common idea of justice. The virtue of the Westphalian
model of a world of sovereign states that emerged in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries was that it was able to secure peace in the face of
religious disagreement. The virtue of this model in the twenty-first cen-
tury is that it might preserve peace in the face of ethical diversity. One
way of describing this model of global order is as an archipelago of
interdependent jurisdictions not subject to any common power, existing
under norms of mutual toleration. Justice has no significant part to play
in accounting for such an order.13
11 The virtue of the Peace of Westphalia was not that it established the authority of the
state but that it weakened the forces of religious imperialism by lessening the influence of
the Holy Roman Empire and the House of Hapsburg. It meant that religious questions could
no longer be decided by a majority of the imperial estates and that future disputes would
be decided by compromise among religious authorities.
12 There is, however, the danger that the state will exercise its power to make treaties that
end up binding provincial and local governments while also removing some responsibilities
from their jurisdictions.
13 I have offered a more elaborate account of such an order in The Liberal Archipelago: A
Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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III. Reasons for the Limited Role of Justice
The primary reason for limiting the role of justice in international affairs
is that understandings of justice are diverse and contentious. A secondary
reason is that the pursuit of justice threatens to do little more than enhance
the influence of the dominant states, and of the elites that guide them,
while taking us further away from self-rule. We should consider these
reasons more closely.
To begin with the primary reason, though justice is a value or an ideal
that is universally recognized, it is also one whose content is widely
disputed. It is disputed in several different and important ways. First,
there is widespread disagreement about what are the fundamental re-
quirements of justice. This disagreement is clearly in evidence among
philosophers and scholars, who have disputed the merits of liberal, social-
ist, libertarian, utilitarian, Marxian, and other principles of distributive
justice. However, even among people more generally, there are disagree-
ments: for one thing, the various political parties in most Western democ-
racies favor different standards of social justice, and appeal to different
concerns or attitudes found in their electorates. Moreover, while the polit-
ical parties may try to win office by appealing to the median voter, the
fact remains that there are also voters at the extremes. It is also worth
noting that often there is a significant gap between the attitudes of party
elites and the masses within the party on a host of issues—including
justice.
Second, there is disagreement about issues of justice because there is
disagreement about questions of value.14 Some peoplemay value a resource
because they regard it as having spiritual significance, while others may
look at the same resource and see it as a potential source of material
wealth. Thus, for example, some Aboriginal peoples have been reluctant
to exploit the mineral wealth on lands they hold sacred, while their fellow
citizens have argued that not exploiting these resources deprives others of
the income that might be generated for everyone. Similarly, the issue of
whether to permit oil exploration in wilderness areas brings out the con-
flict between those who attach greater value to the preservation of natural
beauty or endangered ecosystems and those who see the need for energy
as more pressing. Even those who agree on principles of justice in distri-
bution may disagree on what should be distributed and how it should be
valued.
There is a further complication here. Often it is difficult to say just what
is the value of the resources a particular society or community may have,
since questions of value can only be settled against the range of back-
ground conditions that give things worth. Oil was not an asset but a lia-
14 Here I have drawn on David Miller’s analysis in “Justice and Global Inequality,”
193–96.
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bility when discovered in the days before there was any demand for
petroleum. Today, uranium would be of little value to a society unable to
exploit it, and soil suitable for cultivating vines would not be prized in a
society of teetotalers. Even if value could be established here, however, there
is also the problem of determining how different values are to be traded
off. Some communities may prefer to trade off higher incomes from ura-
nium sales for untouched wilderness and rural enterprise. Some commu-
nities may prefer to trade off future income by consuming their resources
more rapidly now—opting for development rather than conservation. Some
communitieswill simply havemore children than others, and thiswill affect
the distribution of resources. This can have a bearing on justice to the extent
that these choices affect the overall distribution of resources not onlywithin
but also among different communities. Clearly, however, different com-
munities will favor different conceptions of justice, since not every con-
ception of justice will support the values of every community.
Third, a problem arises because different communities or societies have
different understandings of property. This means not only that there are
different understandings of what ownership means—what rights and
duties come with possession of different kinds of things owned—but also
that there are different understandings of how ownership may be trans-
ferred and to whom. Laws of inheritance vary from society to society,
sometimes considerably.
Fourth, there may be disagreements about justice to the extent that
there are more general ethical disagreements among people. For example,
to the extent that people disagree about the morality of abortion or assisted
suicide, they may also disagree about whether to subsidize pregnancy
termination and related forms of medical care or to subsidize adoption—or
whether to subsidize anything at all. But there are also other matters on
which people disagree that have a bearing on justice. Different religions,
communities, and societies have varying attitudes on the definition of
childhood and the responsibilities of children and parents. They differ on
what they recognize as marriage and what they consider the proper
grounds for divorce. At the extreme, there are differences among people
as to what constitutes harm to or violation of persons. Most people would
consider female genital mutilation an unjustifiable violation of a child’s
body, but some communities consider it not just acceptable but a duty of
responsible parents in their societies.
In the face of this great diversity of views about justice, and aboutmoral-
ity more generally, how can justice be pursued across a variety of com-
munities with different views about what justice demands? This is a
problem not just for international society but also for domestic societies,
particularly if a society is large and internally diverse. Countries such as
India, China, Russia, Brazil, Indonesia, and theUnited States contain numer-
ous communities with different languages, religions, customs, and ethical
traditions. Under such circumstances, themost a society can reasonably pur-
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sue is the establishment of a framework or set of norms that might accom-
modate ethical disagreement, allowing different traditions to coexist.
An alternative view, however, is that even in the face of diversity and
ethical disagreement, it is nonetheless important to pursue justice, at least
to ensure that some standards of universal significance prevail. This is vital
in the international realm no less than in domestic societies. This requires
establishing international institutions, governed by universal ethical stan-
dards, aimed at promoting justice and ensuring that the actions of states
and communities alike are governed by standards of justice. It means reject-
ing “moral minimalism” in favor of developing institutions governed by
robust ethical standards that apply across international borders.15 But this
view has to be rejected if ethical diversity is to be taken seriously.
This brings us to the secondary reason for limiting the role of justice in
international affairs. If there are substantial differences over questions of
justice, then trying to establish institutions whose purpose is to serve
justice can produce either of two outcomes. First, it can lead to the cre-
ation of institutions of justice on which there is general agreement, but
only because the understanding of “justice” is diluted or broadened to
secure agreement among the different parties. Or, second, it can lead to
the dominant powers establishing their own preferred understandings of
justice, and running the institutions created according to their own ethical
convictions—not to mention their interests. Most likely, we will see some
combination of these two outcomes, which means that we will see some
kind of rule by elites in the name of something they agree to call “justice.”
The establishment in 1998 of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
provides an illustration of the problematic role of elites in the establish-
ment of institutions of international justice. The impetus to create the
court came from the failed attempts to prosecute GeneralAugusto Pinochet
in Britain and in Spain for crimes, including torture, illegal detention,
causing the disappearance of persons, and murder, alleged to have been
committed while he was president of Chile. The ICC, it was hoped, would
help resolve the problem of determining the legal jurisdiction in which
such charges could be brought against persons accused of war crimes or
crimes against humanity. After several years of preparation and five weeks
of negotiation in Rome, the ICC was established on July 17, 1998, but not
before the provisions of the statute governing its operation, and the def-
initions of crime that it would work with, were suitably modified to
placate the convictions and interests of various parties.16 Thus, for exam-
ple, the definition of crimes against humanity brought protests for refer-
ences to gender persecution (from some Islamic states) and to enforced
sterilization (from China). Syria and a number of Arab states insisted that
15 “Moral minimalism” is a term used by Allen Buchanan in Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-
Determination, 38ff.
16 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The document may be found at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/officialjournal/legalinstruments.html.
10 CHANDRAN KUKATHAS
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052506060018
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core . Singapore M
anagem
ent U
niversity (SM
U
) , on 26 A
ug 2019 at 01:34:50 , subject to the C
am
bridge C
ore term
s of use, available at https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core/term
s .
the list of crimes compiled to illustrate the prohibition on attacks on
civilian populations would be acceptable provided it only applied in
cases of inter-state conflict. Israel objected to Article 8 (section viii), which
included in the definition of a war crime “the transfer directly or indi-
rectly by an Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into
the territory it occupies,” 17 arguing that this provision was aimed at its
policies on Jewish settlements on the West Bank.
The United States also had serious objections to the Rome Statute,
worrying that the war crimes provisions could be used by its enemies to
prosecute its soldiers serving abroad. Along with many other states, it
expressed a concern over granting any proposed court the sole power to
determine what constituted an act of aggression, particularly since this
would contravene the authority of the United Nations Security Council.
Since the United States is a permanent member of the Security Council,
with a right of veto over its resolutions, the U.S. took a much less favor-
able view of such an outcome than did India, which would like to be but
is not a permanent member. In the end, however, the final statute incor-
porated provisions ensuring the sovereign rights of states, and enabling
the court to operate only at the invitation of states or of the Security
Council—though even then, a number of states, including the United
States, Russia, China, and all the states of the Middle East except Jordan,
declined to become members of the ICC.18
In the end, an institution established to deal with criminal justice was
shaped as much by the interests of important powers as by any concern
for justice. The more general point this leads to is that international polit-
ical institutions, like many domestic ones, are shaped by the interests and
attitudes of elites. Unlike many local political institutions, however, the
elites in question are a long way removed from the people who are
ultimately governed by them.
To extend responsibility for justice to international institutions is to
detract from self-government. This point was recognized in 1863 by Lord
Acton in his analysis of the implications of the development of the nation-
state itself and its usurpation of the powers of local jurisdictions. True
republicanism, he argued, “is the principle of self-government in the
whole and in all the parts.” In an extensive country, he continued, self-
government could only prevail in a confederacy, “so that a large republic
not founded on the federal principle must result in the government of a
single city, like Rome and Paris.” A great democracy, he concluded, “must
either sacrifice self-government to unity, or preserve it by federalism.” 19
17 Ibid., 12.
18 For a helpful analysis, see Spyros Economides, “The International Criminal Court,” in
Karen E. Smith and Margot Light, eds., Ethics and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 112–28.
19 Lord Acton, “Nationality,” in Selected Writings of Lord Acton: Volume I: Essays in the
History of Liberty, ed. Rufus Fears (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1986), 409–33, at 414–15.
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To try to establish a single standard of social justice even within a single
country is a dubious undertaking. If a standard is agreed to by different
communities, with different ethical traditions, that standard will be a
weak one that reflects the compromises made to secure agreement rather
than anything resembling justice. If the standard of justice is imposed by
the more powerful, however, self-government will be sacrificed—without
there being any assurance that the standards imposed have anything to
do with justice rather than the interests of the dominant powers. This
point holds even more strongly for international institutions. Powerful
nations or coalitions will always find it advantageous to use the language
of justice to defend the arrangements they establish. But this does not
mean that justice is what they will pursue or defend.
We should be wary, then, of proposals to take action or devise institu-
tions to secure international or global justice. The chances are that such
proposals will simply serve the interests of elites, and will not secure
justice even to the extent that we agree on what justice amounts to. More
worryingly, however, appeals to justice, particularly when institutional-
ized, may simply serve as a cover or pretext for intervention in the affairs
of people unwilling to accept ethical standards other than their own. At
worst, such appeals may serve as pretexts for war. To the extent that it is
important that we consider establishing international institutions to address
matters of global concern, our priority should be not working out what
justice requires and how it might be pursued but how to ensure that the
power of global institutions, or the power that might be exerted through
them, is kept limited. In the international domain, no less than in the
domestic realm, the main political problem is how to keep power in
check, not how to devise mechanisms to do good.
What this position implies is that in the international realm we should
be concerned not to establish institutions that facilitate intervention in the
affairs of other societies but to secure norms of toleration. A further impli-
cation of this outlook must also be recognized. If toleration is to take
priority over justice, this means that injustice will have to be tolerated.
This may be difficult if the perceived injustice is great. Nonetheless, tol-
eration means nonintervention even in cases of injustice. For this reason,
many hold either that toleration must be redefined so that justice estab-
lishes its limits, or that toleration must be subordinated to justice—
perhaps to the extent that toleration simply becomes irrelevant as a
substantial moral consideration.20 The position defended here is that tol-
eration takes precedence over justice.
It is important, however, to make clear what is not an implication of my
view. The argument advanced here is not the one offered by Rawls in The
20 John Rawls advances the first view in A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1999); Deborah Fitzmaurice advances the second in “Autonomy as a Good:
Liberalism, Autonomy, and Toleration,” Journal of Political Philosophy 1, no. 1 (1993): 1–16.
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Law of Peoples, which seeks to make a case not merely for nonintervention
but also for respecting nonliberal peoples and states if they come up to
certain minimal standards of morality.21 I am not suggesting that we
should think about the world as constituted by “peoples,” or that we
need to address the issue of whether or not certain societies deserve our
respect. Nor, however, am I suggesting that states or state sovereignty are
worthy of respect for other reasons such as those advanced by Martha
Nussbaum in her critique of Rawls. For Nussbaum, “we ought to respect
the state” since the state is “morally important because it is an expression
of human choice and autonomy,” because it “expresses the desire of
human beings to live under laws they give to themselves.” 22 My position
makes no such assumption about the nature of the state; indeed, it is
entirely skeptical about the state’s moral credentials.23
It is also important to note that my view denies the significance of a
distinction sometimes drawn between “not tolerating” and “interven-
ing.” The philosopher Kok-Chor Tan, for example, argues that a global
theory of justice based on comprehensive24 liberal ideas “does not face
the tension between tolerating nonliberal societies and protecting indi-
vidual liberty—it simply does not tolerate nonliberal societies.” 25 But not
tolerating, Tan insists, does not mean intervening. Indeed, there is a very
strong presumption against intervening, especially with military force,
even on behalf of oppressed peoples. Liberal states, he thinks, may take
a whole range of other actions short of armed intervention, including
public criticism and condemnation of nonliberal states. Comprehensive
liberals “can deploy state (i.e., publicly shared) resources to question and
even criticize some nonliberal group practices without actually criminal-
izing or enacting legislation against them.” 26 Much the same kind of view
is advanced by Nussbaum, who makes a distinction between the justifi-
cation and the implementation of moral standards. We may think that the
standards of a nation are defective, but this does not mean that it would
21 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
22 Martha Nussbaum, “Women and Theories of Global Justice: The Need for New Para-
digms,” in Deen K. Chatterjee, ed., The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 147–76, at 167.
23 To be candid, it seems to me that the idea that the state is (ever) an expression of human
autonomy is a piece of wild romantic fiction. Its hold on the intellectual imagination is
surely testimony to the brilliance and ingenuity of some of the outstanding philosophers of
the past several centuries.
24 “Comprehensive liberal” ideas contrast with “political liberal” ones. Comprehensive
liberals take liberalism to be a doctrine that adheres to or upholds certain views about what
values are central to leading a valuable human life—values such as individuality and
autonomy. Political liberals think that comprehensive liberalism runs the risk of simply
becoming another sectarian doctrine rather than adhering to the liberal ideal of finding
neutral ground for the accommodation of different ideals of what makes for a good life.
25 Kok-Chor Tan, Toleration, Diversity, and Global Justice (University Park: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 2000), 82.
26 Ibid., 60.
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be right “to intervene, either militarily or through economic and political
sanctions, simply in order to implement better human rights protec-
tions”—in most cases, “diplomatic pressures and persuasion seem more
fitting than any sort of coercion.” 27
The problem with relying on this distinction (between “not tolerating”
and “intervening”) to diminish the likelihood of being drawn down the
path of intervention is that it does not recognize the significance of the
presumption against intervention in the affairs of people in other states or
communities. The reason for rejecting justice in favor of toleration is
precisely that this stance makes clear that nonintervention is the default
position. It is intervention, particularly if it is to involve coercion or
violence, that requires justification. Tan and Nussbaum, in different ways,
want to assert the primacy of justice or substantive standards of morality;
but in insisting that such standards may only be enforced in very rare
cases, they, in effect, concede the priority of the principle of noninterven-
tion or toleration over justice. In the case of Tan’s claim that criticism
without intervention or enforcement is not toleration, the use of the word
“toleration” seems odd to the extent that it makes even criticism an act
of intolerance. It surely makes more sense to say that we are intolerant
not when we reject or criticize another’s views but when we try to impose
our own through the exercise of force rather than through persuasive
reasoning.28
IV. Arguments for Global Justice
The main targets of this essay’s criticism, then, are those who defend
global justice as an ideal that should inform the establishment of inter-
national institutions, and would form the basis for collective action to
enforce standards of morality across the world. The literature advancing
the case for global justice is substantial. Rather than try to address it as a
whole, the remainder of this essay will focus on arguments developed by
two philosophers, Allen Buchanan and Thomas Pogge. Both reject the
view advanced by Rawls and others that justice should be pursued only
within the confines of the nation-state: Buchanan emphasizes the impor-
tance of protecting human rights as an imperative of the natural duty of
justice, and Pogge emphasizes the importance of reforming the global
basic structure to end world poverty. I will consider these arguments in
turn, beginning with Buchanan’s.
According to Buchanan, justice must be the primary moral goal of
international law. He rejects the idea that peace should be the main goal
27 Nussbaum, “Women and Theories of Global Justice,” 165–66.
28 See Glen Newey, Virtue, Reason, and Toleration: The Place of Toleration in Ethical and
Political Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), esp. 18–35; see alsoAndrew
J. Cohen, “What Toleration Is,” Ethics 115, no. 1 (2004): 68–95.
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of the international system, and that the ideals of peace and justice are in
conflict. He writes:
[I]t is wrong to assume that justice and peace are somehow essentially
in conflict. On the contrary, justice largely subsumes peace. Justice
requires the prohibition of wars of aggression (understood as mor-
ally unjustifiable attacks as opposed to justified wars of self-defense
or of humanitarian intervention) because wars of aggression inher-
ently violate human rights. To that extent the pursuit of justice is the
pursuit of peace.29
He adds that “protecting some of the most important human rights is
securing peace.” 30
This view, Buchanan insists, is not as extreme as might be thought. It
does not deny that justice may sometimes conflict with peace—though,
for the most part, this will be the case in the period of transition from very
unjust to more just conditions.31 Furthermore, he concedes that the prin-
ciple “Let there be justice, though the world perish” is not defensible. A
commitment to justice cannot require allowing considerations of justice to
trump all other moral considerations in every instance, for not all injus-
tices are equally serious. The protection of basic human rights should be
the primary goal of the international system, but this is entirely compat-
ible with the fact that justice is not all that matters.32 Nonetheless, “the
protection of basic human rights is the core of justice, and the raison d’être
for political power.” 33
There are two arguments that Buchanan offers for the conclusion that
justice is a morally obligatory goal of international law. The first is that
there is a global basic structure of institutions through which people
across the globe relate and that this basic structure can be assessed for its
justice. If justice is, as Rawls asserted, the first virtue of social institutions,
then “justice is a morally imperative institutional goal,” in the global as
well as in the domestic sphere.34 Here Buchanan endorses Thomas Pogge’s
contention that the global basic structure is a human creation, and that to
accept it uncritically would be to support massive injustices.35 The second
argument is that there is a “Natural Duty of Justice” that requires every-
one to contribute to ensuring that all persons have access to just institu-
tions, and that this implies that “justice is a morally obligatory goal of
29 Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, 79 (emphasis in original).
30 Ibid (emphasis in original).
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 80–81.
33 Ibid., 259.
34 Ibid., 84–85.
35 Ibid., 85. Pogge first developed this view in Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1989), though he has developed the arguments more forcefully in
his later writings.
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international law.” 36 This duty flows from a “Moral Equality Principle”;
and equal consideration of persons requires that we help to ensure that
they have access to institutions that protect their basic rights.37 We have
a duty not simply not to harm but to help, even at substantial cost to
ourselves.
With this outlook comes a particular view of the state and its ethical
basis. Buchanan rejects what he calls the “discretionary association” view,
according to which the state is nothing more than a discretionary asso-
ciation for the mutual advantage of its citizens—designed to further their
interests.38 On this view, “the state is not even in part an instrument for
moral progress.” 39 This view is, in the end, entirely incompatible with the
Natural Duty of Justice.40
The view Buchanan defends is one he describes as “moderate cosmo-
politanism.” It recognizes that we have moral obligations beyond our
own borders, but without going to the extreme of suggesting that all our
particular obligations are simply derived from our obligations to human-
ity more broadly.41 Equally, he insists, it is not a view that, in rejecting the
discretionary association conception, suggests that governments may sim-
ply use the resources of the state to pursue global justice as they choose.
Indeed, the state is, at least in part, “a resource for global, not just local,
progress toward justice.” 42 But its officials must be properly authorized,
ideally by democratic processes, to carry out their fiduciary obligations.43
What is very clearly rejected, however, is the idea that the national inter-
est is the supreme value that should guide the conduct of foreign policy.44
This would be entirely inconsistent with a view that gives an important
place to human rights.
Central to Buchanan’s argument is the claim that there are basic human
rights, and that there is “an expanding global culture of human rights that
exhibits a broad consensus on the idea that justice requires respect for the
inherent dignity of all persons.” 45 In this regard, he rejects the contention
that there is widespread moral disagreement, and the idea that no global
moral consensus can emerge. The evidence, in his view, points the other
way. Thus, he rejects arguments, such as those offered by political phi-
losopher Michael Walzer, that the world is marked by “deep distributive
pluralism”; or that societies ought to be able to develop their own prin-
36 Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, 86.
37 Ibid., 88.
38 Ibid., 98–99.
39 Ibid., 100.
40 Ibid., 103.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 104.
43 Ibid., 104–5. Buchanan recognizes that a theory of democratic authorization is needed
to make the argument complete, though it is not his immediate concern to fill in this
particular gap.
44 Ibid., 106–16.
45 Ibid., 42.
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ciples of justice.46 Buchanan also rejects as a reason for minimizing the
role of distributive justice in the development of international law the
idea that the international system lacks the institutional capacity to deter-
mine the requirements for, and to enforce, distributive justice. Our aim, he
thinks, should be to develop that capacity.47
Buchanan argues not only for theoretical innovation but also for prac-
tical reform of the international legal order. Two aspects of his argument
merit special mention. First, he makes clear that it is necessary to develop
“a more permissive law regarding humanitarian intervention,” for “lib-
eralizing the international law of humanitarian intervention is likely to be
a necessary condition for achieving” other reforms.48 Second, Buchanan
rejects the idea of relying on the development of customary law,49 or
working through established authorities like the United Nations, to estab-
lish appropriate conventions, arguing that a serious commitment to the
international rule of law may require deliberate effort, by a coalition of
like-minded (and right-minded) countries, to establish new rules of inter-
national law—illegally, if necessary. He makes this plain when he writes:
[C]onsider again the proposal for a treaty-based, rule-governed inter-
vention regime whose members would be restricted to the most dem-
ocratic, human-rights respecting states. To the extent that it authorizes
humanitarian interventions in the absence of Security Council autho-
rization, such a regime would violate existing international law. But
it would embody, rather than repudiate, a commitment to the rule of
law in the normatively rich sense.50
In fact, Buchanan insists that being “willing to act illegally to make a very
unjust system more just need not be inconsistent with a commitment to
justice through law; it may indeed be required by it.” 51
Buchanan’s concern is to present a case for the creation or reform of
basic international institutions in order to bring about a more just world.
Such reforms would bring about justice by protecting or enforcing indi-
vidual rights. Despite some significant philosophical differences between
their approaches, Buchanan’s concerns are shared by Thomas Pogge, who
also calls for reform of the basic structure of international society, but
whose writings on global justice have focused on the problem of world
poverty and human rights rather than on international law.52
46 Ibid., 201–2.
47 Ibid., 202–3.
48 Ibid., 445–46.
49 Ibid., 446–49.
50 Ibid., 462.
51 Ibid.
52 See esp. Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Malden, MA: Polity Press,
2002).
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For Pogge, the interdependence of persons in a world order makes it
essential that we look at justice in global rather than local terms. Institu-
tional interconnections across the planet, he argues, “render obsolete the
idea that countries can peacefully agree to disagree about justice, each
committing itself to a conception of justice appropriate to its history,
culture, population size and density, natural environment, geopolitical
context, and stage of development.” 53 In the modern world, people’s
lives are profoundly affected by global rules of governance, trade, and
diplomacy; and about such institutions we cannot agree to disagree, since
they can only be structured one way—not differently in each country. If
they are to be justified to all persons in all parts of the world, “then we
must aspire to a single, universal criterion of justice which all persons and
peoples can accept as the basis for moral judgments about the global
order.” 54 This acceptance is vitally important, for it matters that a soci-
ety’s institutional order be endorsed by those to whom the order applies.
This is why “we should try to formulate the universal criterion of justice
so that it can gain universal acceptance.” 55
Despite his emphasis on universalism, Pogge is aware of its shortcom-
ings and has some sympathy for the contextualist ethics defended by
philosopher David Miller.56 Pogge’s most serious criticisms of contextu-
alism, however, are reserved for John Rawls, whom he charges with
offering a theory that fails to justify applying quite different fundamental
principles to national and international institutional schemes. For exam-
ple, Pogge argues, Rawls rejects the difference principle57 as a require-
ment of global justice on the ground that it is unacceptable for one people
to bear the costs of decisions made by another—decisions on national
birth-rates, for instance—but Rawls does not explain “why this ground
should not analogously disqualify the difference principle for national
societies as well,” since one province or township may have to bear the
costs of decisions made by another.58 To the extent that Rawls argues that
his theory, and the difference principle in particular, can only apply to a
closed society or a self-contained system, Pogge also points out, it is hard
to see why it should not apply to the world if it can apply to the United
States, which is neither closed nor self-contained. If the objection is that
principles of justice must be acceptable to the people who live under
53 Ibid., 33.
54 Ibid. (emphasis in original).
55 Ibid., 34.
56 Ibid., 102–4.
57 Rawls advances the “difference principle” as a part of the second of his two principles
of justice. Broadly, it asserts that in a just society, institutions of justice would permit
inequalities only provided that social arrangements were such that the welfare of the least-
advantaged or worst-off group in society was higher than it could be under any other
arrangements. Rawls’s most recent discussion of the difference principle is in John Rawls,
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
58 Pogge, World Poverty, 105. Rawls’s claim is in The Law of Peoples, 116–18.
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them, as they are not in other parts of the world, Pogge replies that the
same holds true for the United States, where the difference principle is not
one that commands agreement59—even, one might add, among liberal
political philosophers. If there are reasons why the standards of justice
that apply domestically cannot be applied internationally, Pogge argues,
Rawls has not supplied them.
For Pogge, there are compelling reasons why justice is an issue that has
to be addressed globally. First, it is clear that many people live lives of
desperate poverty and enormous suffering, even as others, particularly in
the countries of the developed West, enjoy great affluence. Second, an
important cause of this suffering—and affluence—is the system of global
institutions that protects the wealth of some while prolonging the poverty
of others. Third, to the extent that global institutions are capable of being
reformed but have not been improved, those who benefit from those
institutions must bear responsibility for the condition of those who suffer
under them. In the world today, Pogge maintains, the affluent benefit
from a system that sustains radical inequality such that they enjoy sig-
nificant advantages in the use of a single natural resource base—the
earth—from whose benefits the worst-off are excluded without compen-
sation. This system itself emerged out of a historical process that was
pervaded by massive, grievous wrongs.60
As a first step toward justice, Pogge proposes the establishment of a
Global Resources Dividend (GRD)—a fund created by payments made by
all states, to be used to eradicate poverty—“to ensure that all human
beings can meet their own basic needs with dignity.” 61 With the help of
“economists and international lawyers,” Pogge suggests, it may be pos-
sible to design a scheme that disburses funds to the poor—if necessary,
directly rather than through their governments—and provides govern-
ments with incentives to rule better.62 “Agood government brings enhanced
prosperity through GRD support and thereby generates more popular
support which in turn makes it safer from coup attempts.” 63 Such a
scheme would not only make available funds owed to the world’s poor,
but also encourage the governments of developing countries to pursue
much-needed reforms. “Combined with suitable disbursement rules, the
GRD can stimulate a peaceful international competition in effective pov-
erty eradication.” 64
Like Buchanan, Pogge defends what amounts to a moderate cosmo-
politanism. What both philosophers share is a conviction that justice is a
59 Pogge, World Poverty, 106.
60 Ibid., 201–3. In this account, I have contracted Pogge’s more elaborate, careful, and
sophisticated argument, but without, I hope, misrepresenting it or failing to capture its
spirit.
61 Ibid., 197.
62 Ibid., 206.
63 Ibid., 207.
64 Ibid.
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global issue, though both want to give particularism some due. Both thus
make what they regard as moderate proposals for reforming global insti-
tutions. Neither thinks that a proper respect for human dignity or moral
principle warrants anything less.
V. Against Global Justice
There can be no doubt that we live in a world in which many people
suffer poverty and oppression, or that where one is born has a greater
bearing on one’s prospects in life than, say, one’s talents or character. A
modern variant of the ancient Chinese curse might well run, “May you
live in an interesting country.” There is surely a case for helping the
destitute, opening our borders to those looking to make a better life, and
welcoming those who are trying to escape oppressive regimes. This does
not mean, however, that there is a case for seeking the mirage of global
justice, and the problems with the theories advanced by Buchanan and
Pogge help to bring this out. Both set out to show that universal justice is
desirable, and that it may be better secured across the world by the
reform or creation of institutions authorized and empowered to do so. Yet
the outcome of their philosophical effort is, in effect, a justification of rule
by elites, guided by (and unchecked by anything other than) a commit-
ment to a view of justice. We should be skeptical of these efforts, for they
promise only elite rule, not justice.
One important reason for this is that political institutions cannot secure
justice, particularly when they cover large areas of territory and a great
number and diversity of people. The most they can secure is peace as
people agree to abide by common laws and the rule of common author-
ities. There are two reasons why justice is not a likely outcome. First,
given the nature of politics, the institutions or rules that are adopted will
reflect not the demands of justice but the balance of power. Second, the
likelihood of agreement on justice diminishes with the increasing size of
the polity: any agreement reached will be a compromise, assented to in
the end in order to bring negotiation to a close. To say this is not to take
refuge in skepticism about justice. One might remain convinced that one
view of justice is true and still recognize that political institutions are
incapable of securing it, or that securing it is no part of their purpose.
Allen Buchanan takes a different view in arguing that justice subsumes
peace, and that the best way to secure peace is to secure justice by pro-
tecting human rights. But this seems straightforwardly implausible. If
two parties to a dispute disagree about justice but one is successful in
having his view of justice prevail, there is no reason to think that this will
produce peace between them. If peace is produced because one is able to
persuade the other that his view of justice really is correct, it is agreement
that produces peace, not the justice of the agreed-upon view. Peace would
be the outcome even if the agreed-upon view of justice was wrong. If
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agreement were the outcome simply of the stronger party’s being able to
enforce his view of justice, the resulting peace would hardly be the prod-
uct of justice, simply of power.
Consider as an illustration what is perhaps the most intractable of all
problems in contemporary international politics: the dispute over Pales-
tine. It would be simplifying matters considerably even to assert that
there were only two sides to this conflict. We can say, however, that there
are a number of issues in play: the legitimacy of the very existence of
Israel; the proper boundaries of the Israeli state (whether they should be
defined by the 1947 U.N. determination, or the war at the founding of the
state, or the 1967 war, or the view of the present Israeli state, or some
other set of considerations altogether); the right of return, if any, of Pal-
estinian refugees; the status of Jewish settlers and their settlements on the
West Bank; and the rights of Palestinians or Arabs living or working in
Israel. It is safe to say that there is agreement neither among Israelis nor
among Palestinians about what justice demands, let alone agreement
between the government of Israel and the various groups, including the
Palestinian Authority, who claim to speak on behalf of all Palestinians. To
suggest that the path to peace in this land is to establish justice by pro-
tecting human rights seems utterly implausible given the unlikelihood
that those who lose by the establishment of what is alleged to be justice
will simply accept the outcome with good grace—even if the judgment
were offered by Solomon himself. Buchanan suggests that justice requires
the prohibition of wars of aggression “understood as morally unjustified
attacks as opposed to justified wars of self-defense or of humanitarian
intervention.” 65 Yet each of the warring parties in the Holy Land believes
others to be the aggressors and sees itself as acting in self-defense. If we
must wait for this disagreement over justice to be settled before there can
be peace, we will be waiting for a long time. If there is any plausible route
to peace, it must surely involve most parties’ recognizing and accepting
that they will not obtain justice in the sense of receiving the full measure
of what they regard as their due, but being willing to take less than justice
in the interests of peace. This would surely be easier to take than being
forced to accept that what one receives is all that one is justly entitled to.66
Buchanan, however, suggests that “progress towards justice is espe-
cially likely to require illegal acts if the system’s imperfections include
serious barriers to expeditious, legally permissible reform,” and recom-
mends the creation of a “rule-governed intervention regime,” its mem-
bership restricted to the “most democratic, human rights–respecting
states,” to authorize intervention in regimes that violate human rights.67
For him, current norms of nonintervention are too robust and are an
65 Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, 79.
66 As H. L. Mencken once observed, albeit with a slightly different point in mind, “injus-
tice anyone can take, what really stings is justice.”
67 Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, 462.
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obstacle to the establishment of justice. But it is difficult to know what to
make of this call for human rights–respecting states to take matters into
their own hands in the name of justice.68 To the extent that his point is
simply that illegal acts are sometimes morally justified, it is hard to dis-
agree. It is also fair to say that those acting illegally may well be truly
committed to the rule of law, in the way that, say, Martin Luther King or
Gandhi were in their acts of civil disobedience.69 But what would this
mean, say, for international society confronted by the knowledge of these
past acts of civil disobedience and their suppression by the American and
British governments? The norm in international law is that other states
not intervene in such cases, even when accusations of human rights vio-
lations are very serious. Buchanan’s proposal is that a coalition of right-
thinking nations should not simply intervene in such cases, but should
get together, rewrite international law, authorize themselves to act, and
then claim to be acting lawfully—understanding law “in the normatively
rich way.” 70
This is a troubling view, but it is important to understand what lies
behind it. Buchanan’s concern is that existing international norms (and in
particular, the structure of the United Nations) make it difficult to pursue
justice or morality. Human rights abuses go unaddressed. Reform, he
thinks, is necessary to make it more possible for human rights to be
protected. What is troubling about this view is that it assumes or asserts
that a world in which such constraints on intervention are removed or
weakened will be a better world, presumably because the just are freer to
act. Yet it would also leave the unjust freer to act. If the recommendation
is that right-thinking states should combine when necessary, restructure
patterns of international authority by establishing treaties, and then autho-
rize themselves to act in the name of justice, this looks like a general
invitation to all states to so act. No state thinks it is not right-thinking, and
most even claim to recognize human rights—and indeed are signatories
to the major human rights agreements, including the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (1948).71
68 Buchanan does try to make clear that his proposal is “not for a single state, or even a
collection of states, to intervene lawlessly. Instead, the idea is to create a new system of
rules—new principles, processes, and institutions—that embody the normatively rich con-
ception of the rule of law.” Ibid., 462.
69 Buchanan uses these examples; see ibid., 464.
70 Buchanan’s defense of lawbreaking is very different from that suggested by Robert
Goodin, who argues that there may be cases in which it is justified as the only means of
reforming international customary law. See Robert Goodin, “Toward an International Rule
of Law: Distinguishing International Law-Breakers from Would-Be Law-Makers,” Inter-
national Journal of Ethics 9 (2005).
71 Other important human rights declarations include the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights; and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women. For a fuller list, see the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights:
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/intlinst.htm (accessed January 2005).
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Buchanan’s theory, in the end, requires that we accept either one of two
views, the first one implausible and the second unattractive. The first
view is that there is a level of consensus in the international order that
would make it possible for global institutions to be restructured by con-
certed action of the kind he recommends. In fact, however, there is no
such consensus—or at least, not yet. Now, Buchanan is aware of this
argument, but he questions the claim that there is no consensus and
suggests that the implication of denying the existence of consensus is a
denial of the legitimacy of the international system as a whole.72 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, he points out, “as well as other
central human rights conventions, explicitly endorses the idea that the
inherent dignity of free and equal individuals entitles them to be treated
in certain ways—and this sounds very much like a widely shared, core
conception of justice.” 73 This, he thinks, throws into question the whole
“moral minimalist” perspective. Yet the most such agreements reveal is
the existence of elite consensus, and a limited consensus at that. The
reasons why some countries might sign on to important declarations may
have less to do with acceptance (by the elites of those states) of the
expressed moral principles than with the political advantages of joining.
Even after declarations have been endorsed, however, there is no reason
to think that the elites, or populations, of different countries interpret
them in the same way. When the U.N. Human Rights Committee pro-
tested that Iran’s Islamic Penal Code, which required the amputation of
four fingers of the right hand for a first conviction for theft, and flogging
for consuming alcohol, violated article 7 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Iranian government insisted that it
was upholding not violating the covenant. Article 7 prohibits “cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment,” but Iran, as a signatory to
the ICCPR, insisted that it took the strictures of article 7 very seriously,
while interpreting it in a way consistent with its own social norms.74 If
there is an international moral consensus, it is weaker than Buchanan
suggests. He is quite right to say that we should not assume that a
consensus will never emerge; but until it does, we should operate on the
assumption that it does not yet exist.
The second view is that a minority of states should pursue the task of
engaging in the restructuring of global institutions. The objection to this
is not simply that any such effort would fail without the major powers,
such as the United States and the European Union, going along with it,
though Buchanan thinks there is much to be said for trying to engage in
such restructuring without the United States, which is “widely regarded—
72 Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, 308–10; see also 38–45.
73 Ibid., 309.
74 See Kristen Hessler, “Resolving Interpretive Conflicts in International Human Rights
Law,” Journal of Political Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2005).
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and not without reason—as an international scoff-law.” 75 The problem is
that the claim is that international law, and more specifically, a “liberal-
democratic intervention regime,” 76 should be created by a self-selected
elite. This elite, led, in Buchanan’s ideal scenario, by the European Union,
would admit only those countries with “decent” human rights records
and those that meet the minimum criteria for democracy. It would estab-
lish an alternative international organization that would have “a stronger
claim to legitimacy than a state-majoritarian UN entity such as the Gen-
eral Assembly”; after all, “[i]f the goal is to protect human rights, then
who would be better qualified than a coalition of states that have the best
records for doing so?” 77 Yet even if the self-selected members of this
regime should be satisfied that they are the best standard-bearers for
human rights, why would, or should, anyone else accept this assertion, or
accord this group any moral or legal standing simply because it claims to
have the best human rights record?
It is difficult to see how Buchanan’s proposal here amounts to much
more than a recommendation that like-minded states who believe in human
rights should set out to collude and enforce, whenever possible, their own
conception of justice. If this is so, it does not look like an improvement on
the norm that Buchanan is looking to undermine: international customary
law. The disadvantage of customary law is that it changes slowly and is
not a tool that may readily be used to right serious wrongs. It depends on
the development of consensus, mostly among states, and does nothing to
enhance the capacity of international agencies to intervene in the affairs
of tyrannical regimes. Its advantage, however, is precisely that it does
make intervention, and the resort to arms, more difficult.
More generally, whatever the weaknesses of the Westphalian system, it
does have some important virtues. In a world of unequal power, a norm
of nonintervention, even if upheld by a convention recognizing states as
sovereign powers, checks the capacity of stronger states to enforce their
wills. For weaker states, sovereignty is an important asset, particularly if
it can be deployed with effect against stronger states whose assertions of
the common purposes of states in international society can easily be
self-serving and to the detriment of lesser polities. As the theorist of
international relations Hedley Bull noted, “If a right of intervention is
proclaimed for the purpose of enforcing standards of conduct, and yet no
consensus exists in the international community governing its use, then
the door is open to interventions by particular states using such a right as
a pretext.” 78
75 Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, 452.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Hedley Bull, “The Grotian Conception of International Society,” in Herbert Butterfield
and Martin Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays on the Theory of International Politics
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), 51–73, at 71.
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In the end, the world is more diverse than Buchanan’s theory is pre-
pared to admit. We live in an international society that is pluralist rather
than solidarist.79 Until there is in fact greater moral agreement, any attempt
to restructure the international order in accordance with principles of
justice risks sanctioning the enforcement of international norms that serve
the interests of powerful states, without doing much to serve the interests
of weaker states or their members. In any case, we should be wary of
setting up institutions of international justice intended to protect the weak,
because more powerful agents are often better able to exploit the resources
these institutions provide. This is not a decisive consideration; but it is an
important, cautionary one, nonetheless.
This consideration calls into question the claims Buchanan makes on
behalf of the Natural Duty of Justice. The Natural Duty of Justice is “the
limited moral obligation to contribute to ensuring that all persons have
access to just institutions.” 80 Showing proper concern and respect for all
persons, in Buchanan’s view, requires doing what is necessary, within the
limits of what can reasonably be expected of anyone, to ensure that those
persons have access to the institutions needed to protect individual rights.
Thus, “conscientiously acting on the Natural Duty of Justice means sup-
porting institutional efforts to secure justice for all.” 81 In part, the prob-
lem with this is that the very idea that the Natural Duty of Justice requires
acting to ensure that others have access to institutions is not as plausible
as Buchanan suggests. Here he draws on Kant’s idea that there is a duty
to leave the state of nature to enter a juridical condition.82 But all that
really follows from our having a duty of justice is that we must fulfill our
obligations to act justly.83 If some people wish to establish institutions to
govern themselves in order better to secure justice, there is no duty for us
to take part. But even if there were a duty to support institutional efforts
to secure justice for all, that would give us no reason to think that we
should support any institutional efforts that are undertaken. Indeed, one
might be well advised to take a skeptical attitude toward most claims
made in defense of developing institutions—particularly when the claims
are that such institutions will serve justice, rather than the interests of
those creating them.
These considerations also tell against Pogge’s arguments in defense of
establishing an international regime to secure global economic justice.
There is no question that large numbers of people live in poverty. Even on
79 On the use of these terms, see Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius,
Colonialism, and Order in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
35–38.
80 Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, 86.
81 Ibid., 93.
82 See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, trans. John Ladd (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1976).
83 This is true even if one recognizes that there are positive rights that have to be upheld,
and that one’s duties go beyond merely forbearing from violating negative rights.
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very modest assumptions about what constitutes poverty (say, an income
of less than US $1.50 a day), nearly a sixth of humanity is poor. The moral
imperative to address this problem is a strong one. Yet this does not mean
that our obligation is to restructure the international system. There are a
number of steps that can surely be taken unilaterally by individuals and
governments with complete justification. First, it may be incumbent on
those who are well off to act unilaterally to contribute more to relief of the
poor and destitute. Since relief is often better supplied by collective action,
it may be morally better to act through international agencies, such as
Community Aid Abroad or Oxfam, to do so.84 Second, the governments
of various states can act unilaterally to reform their own economic poli-
cies, opening their borders to trade, ceasing to subsidize domestic indus-
tries, admitting greater numbers of refugees and immigrants, particularly
from the ranks of the poor, and ceasing to finance regimes that are cor-
rupt, inefficient, or oppressive—indeed, ceasing to finance other govern-
ments altogether. Free trade does not, at least in principle, require a World
Trade Organization, or formal international agreements.85 Third, inter-
national federations such as the European Union can themselves act uni-
laterally to eliminate practices, including their agricultural policies, that
harm the world’s poor.
Now it might be argued that these recommendations are not enough:
first, because private unilateral action is not going to do very much good,
and second, because it is simply politically naive to think that states will
take unilateral action to open their borders to foreign goods and people.
In the first instance, it is probably true that private charity will not be
sufficient to make a substantial impact on global poverty. Other changes
are necessary. Yet, second, if there is no possibility of states and inter-
national federations taking unilateral action to cease their harmful trade
and immigration policies, there is surely little reason to think that more
ambitious reforms of global economic structures are possible. What hope
is there of a Global Resources Dividend in a world of butter mountains,
wine lakes, and billion-dollar subsidies to grow rice in deserts, or sugar
in the wilderness?
Pogge is looking for solutions that involve reform on a global scale,
using mechanisms that will do justice by making possible large transfers
of funds from rich to poor societies. In his view, justice requires such
transfers to reduce the inequality that exists between the rich and the
poor. The question is, who is to establish what justice demands, and how
are we to ensure that justice is properly served? Pogge’s answer is that
84 For a discussion of the limits of such duties, however, see Neera Badhwar, “Inter-
national Aid: When Giving Becomes a Vice,” elsewhere in this volume. (For Oxfam, see
http://www.oxfam.org.uk.)
85 Even if it is useful to have the World Trade Organization to pressure other nations to
lower their own trade barriers, there is no reason for wealthy nations acting within the WTO
structure not to be more open than the terms of the WTO require.
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these questions will be settled by states, or elites within them, who will
enlist experts—economists and lawyers—to devise suitable schemes to
raise and distribute funds. Whatever practical problems this may involve,
two difficulties stand out. First, the GRD sets out to solve a problem of
global distribution by creating yet another political institution. Yet given
that the existing political institutions have struggled to address the prob-
lem of taking care of the world’s poor, what reason is there to think that
creating another layer of intervention will help in any way? Past experi-
ence suggests that all the problems that beset other institutions, from the
nation-state itself to the agencies of the United Nations, would simply
reappear. In particular, if a fund were created making available for redis-
tribution tens of billions of dollars, it is hard to see how there could not
be another scramble for a slice of the largesse, with the spoils going to
those who know best how to manipulate the system. Even if the outcome
of this was a greater share of the world’s wealth going to the poor, it is not
clear that this would be desirable if it means that poor nations put their
energies not into learning how to develop and manage their productive
assets but into perfecting the art of securing aid money.
Second, establishing institutions of global distributive justice in this
way once again means entrenching the power of the world’s elites: those
powerful states who would supply the funds and control their disburse-
ment, with the help of elites in developing countries. The assumption
here is that good will and sound institutional design will overcome the
major difficulties and enable us to get closer to eliminating global inequal-
ity and securing justice. Past experience, however, suggests only that it
will take us closer to global political inequality.86
VI. Conclusion
The fact of global poverty and the prevalence of oppressive regimes
have provoked the call for attention to the problem of global injustice. The
aim of this essay has not been to deny the existence of poverty or oppres-
sion; its aim has been to seek the appropriate response to these condi-
tions. The main thesis it advances is that the solution does not lie in
86 Much of Pogges’s argument rests on the contention that global poverty and global
inequality are increasing. While there is no doubt of the extent of global poverty, the claim
of growing inequality is controversial. On this, see in particular the work of Surjit Bhalla,
who has argued that, contrary to the received wisdom, inequality has been declining as a
consequence of “globalization”—the lowering of trade barriers and the greater internation-
alization of commerce. See Surjit Bhalla, Imagine Theres’s No Country: Poverty, Inequality, and
Growth in the Era of Globalization (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics,
2002). For criticisms of Bhalla, see Martin Ravallion, “Have We Already Met the Millennium
Development Goal for Poverty?” Institute for International Economics, available at http://
www.iie.com/publications/papers/papers03.htm (accessed February 2005). For Bhalla’s
reply, see “Crying Wolf on Poverty: Or How the Millennium Development Goal for Poverty
Has Already Been Reached,” Institute for International Economics, available at: http://
www.iie.com/research/globalization.htm (accessed February 2005).
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establishing or expanding political powers to address these problems.
This promises neither to establish an acceptable understanding of justice,
nor to do much more than provide another opportunity for political elites
to pursue their own particular ends. However, it should also be made
clear what is not being suggested here.
First, this is not a defense of realism in international politics. In
Buchanan’s account, realism recommends that states be guided at all
times by a concern for their national interests. As a moral theory, this has
little to commend it. The argument here is not that states should pursue
their own interests but that we should not look for ways of increasing the
power of political elites in the expectation that they will do anything but
pursue their own interests. Contrary to what Buchanan and others sug-
gest, the state and other political institutions are not instruments of moral
progress. We should be more thoroughly cynical about political power,
for justice is not its raison d’être.
Second, this is not a rejection of the importance of international law.
What is rejected, however, is the idea that global justice demands sweep-
ing reforms of international institutions, and the establishment of new
structures.
Third, the argument here is not a rejection of cosmopolitanism, even
though it criticizes the work of modest cosmopolitans such as Buchanan
and Pogge. The main assumption of the essay in this regard is that the
development of cosmopolitanism should not be the product of political
reform. It may well be that there will be a convergence across the globe on
common moral standards in the years to come. Unless that happens,
however, we cannot even begin to think in terms of global justice.
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